

Journal Pre-proof

Tsunami awareness and evacuation behaviour during the 2018 Sulawesi Earthquake tsunami

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
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38 **Keywords:** Tsunami; Evacuation; Palu; Awareness; Preparedness; Statistical Analysis

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41 **1. Introduction**

42 ***1.1 Background***

43 Tsunamis can cause widespread damage to coastal areas, as illustrated by the *2004 Indian*
44 *Ocean Tsunami* and *2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami*. For the case of the *2011 Tohoku*
45 *Earthquake and Tsunami* there were almost 16,000 casualties (National Police Agency of Japan
46 2019), and one of the important lessons from such events is that evacuation is the most effective
47 way to protect lives (Shibayama et al. 2013).

48 To increase the number of people who can successfully evacuate during a future tsunami event,
49 it is important to learn from the experience of evacuees during past tsunami events. Lindell and
50 Prater (2010) recommend that post-disaster impact surveys should be conducted to collect
51 information regarding the evacuation experience of residents, which have actually been
52 investigated by a number of researchers in the past through questionnaire/interview surveys and
53 analysis (e.g., Esteban et al. 2016; Takabatake et al. 2018a; Kang et al. 2007; Kajimoto et al.
54 2016). For instance, after the *2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami*, Iemura et al. (2006) conducted a
55 questionnaire survey of the people affected in Banda Aceh, Indonesia and found that the
56 majority of the respondents (94%) were unaware that a tsunami could occur after severe ground
57 shaking. Gregg et al. (2006) investigated how those affected in Thailand had responded to
58 natural signs of the *2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami* (e.g., ground shaking from earthquakes, sea-
59 level changes, wave forms, sounds). According to these authors, although most of the 669
60 respondents had noticed some natural sign of the tsunami, many people did not evacuate before
61 the first wave arrived. Lindell et al. (2015) analysed the responses of 262 residents during the
62 *2009 American Samoa Tsunami* and indicated that 43% expected that the earthquake could
63 cause a tsunami, and 15% obtained some sort of initial information about it from TV/radio
64 broadcasts.

65 A number of questionnaire surveys were also conducted following the *2011 Tohoku Earthquake*
66 *and Tsunami*. The Japanese government (e.g. Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
67 Transportation (MLIT), 2013; Cabinet Office of Japan, 2012) collected data on the evacuation
68 behaviour of more than 10,000 individuals. In terms of triggers for evacuation, 46% of
69 respondents relied on ground shaking, 28% on tsunami warnings, 27% on warnings from
70 people around them, 22% on a warning from family members and 18% on screams of 'tsunami'
71 from other people (these are the top five most frequently cited responses; note that respondents
72 were allowed multiple answers). The data also revealed that around 60% of the respondents
73 expected a tsunami after the earthquake, and more than half of the evacuees used vehicles to
74 evacuate. Yun and Hamada (2012, 2015) compared the evacuation behaviour of survivors and

75 non-survivors during the event and showed that starting time for evacuation was significantly
76 different between them.

77 Although the majority of tsunamis are generated by the vertical displacement of the seafloor due
78 to an earthquake, significant tsunamis are also known to have occurred as a result of subaerial
79 and/or submarine landslides. Nevertheless, almost all past research on tsunami awareness and
80 evacuation has focused on co-seismic tsunami events. One exception is Takabatake et al.
81 (2019a), who conducted a questionnaire survey amongst Indonesian people that were affected
82 by the *2018 Sunda Strait Tsunami*, which was caused by a subaerial landslide (more specifically,
83 the collapse of a volcano, Anak Krakatau). The *1964 Alaska Good Friday Earthquake* generated
84 submarine earthquake tsunamis that affected some coastal areas of Alaska (e.g. Seward, Valdez
85 and Whitter), in addition to also generating co-seismic tsunamis. According to the survey
86 reports (e.g. Lander 1996; Lemke 1967; Grantz et al. 1964), many residents witnessed that the
87 tsunami waves generated by submarine landslides arrived to the coast within a few minutes of
88 the initial ground shaking. Although no questionnaire surveys were conducted to analyse the
89 evacuation behaviour of the affected people, Wood et al. (2014) showed that the location where
90 the highest number of fatalities were recorded corresponds to that where the longest evacuation
91 times are required.

92 Evacuation from submarine landslide tsunamis appears to be more challenging than that from
93 co-seismic tsunamis. As shown in past submarine landslide tsunami events (*1964 Alaska*
94 *Earthquake Tsunami*, *2018 Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami*, as will be explained in the next
95 subsection), such tsunamis are likely to hit coastal areas immediately after the earthquake. To
96 successfully evacuate, people are thus required to have a higher level of awareness and
97 preparedness and initiate evacuation immediately after the earthquake, without expecting to
98 receive tsunami warnings (Wood and Peter 2015). It is thus crucial to analyse the actual
99 evacuation behaviour during submarine landslide tsunami events and derive lessons that can
100 help to decrease the number of fatalities in the future.

101 ***1.2 2018 Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami***


102 An earthquake with a moment magnitude (M_w) of 7.5 struck Donggala Regency in Central
103 Sulawesi, Indonesia, at around 18:02 local time (UTC + 8 h) on 28 September 2018. According
104 to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the estimated epicentre of the earthquake was
105 situated at 0.256° S and 119.846° E, at a depth of 20.0 km (USGS, 2018). Following the initial
106 tremor, significant tsunami waves struck Palu City, a city that lies in a narrow bay of the island
107 (**Fig. 1**), destroying low-lying houses and buildings near the shore. The tsunami also hit
108 settlements in Donggala Regency, which is located north of Palu City. As of January 2019, the

109 National Disaster Management Authority (BNPB) of Indonesia reported that the death toll
110 caused by both the earthquake and tsunami reached 4,340, with 667 missing, 10,679 injured and
111 around 200,000 people still being displaced.

112 The earthquake took place along a strike-slip fault, which are generally not considered to be
113 able to generate significant tsunamis. Thus, after the event many international teams, including
114 the authors of the present study, conducted field surveys to attempt to clarify the tsunami
115 generation mechanism, measure the run-up and inundation heights, and observe the damage to
116 coastal communities (e.g. Arikawa et al., 2018; Muhari et al., 2018; Omira et al., 2019;
117 Robertson et al., 2019; Mikami et al., 2019; Stolle et al., 2019). **Figure 1** presents the locations
118 of the surveys conducted by the authors, showing that tsunami heights of above 4 m were
119 recorded inside the bay, and below 4 m near its mouth. In **Figure 1**, tsunami heights are above
120 the tide level at the time of the estimated tsunami arrival time (see Mikami et al. 2019), and the
121 tidal range is around 2 m. Severe damage was concentrated within 200 m from the shoreline.
122 Through the results of observations and computer simulations many authors (e.g., Heidarzadeh
123 et al, 2018; Arikawa et al., 2018; Omira et al., 2019; Takagi et al., 2019; Sasa and Takagawa,
124 2018) concluded that the event was most likely to have been generated by submarine landslides,
125 and there is evidence that many of them occurred inside the bay after the earthquake. In fact, a
126 pilot who took off from the airport in Palu City just before the earthquake recorded a video
127 showing unusual waves being generated on the west side of the bay, which quickly propagated
128 (Takagi et al., 2019).

129

130



131

132 **Fig. 1** Distribution of the tsunami heights measured along the coastline in Palu and Donggala (data
 133 from Mikami et al., 2019). Tsunami heights are above the tidal level at the estimated time of tsunami
 134 arrival. White lines show city boundaries.

135

136 During the event, immediately after the initial earthquake (at 18:02 local time) the BMKG
 137 issued a tsunami warning showing possible wave heights of 0.5 to 3 m for coastal areas,
 138 including Sulawesi Island (the warning was subsequently lifted at 18:39 local time). However, a

139 newspaper article (Suroyo and Ungku, 2018) reported that residents neither received text alerts
140 nor heard sirens during the disaster (which may have been due to the damage that power
141 transmission lines suffered as a consequence of the earthquake). According to Takagi et al.
142 (2019) and Carvajal et al. (2019), the tsunamis reached coastal areas within several minutes
143 after the ground shaking.

144 **1.3 Objectives**

145 As explained earlier, although there is a need to investigate the actual evacuation behaviour that
146 takes place during a submarine landslide tsunami, to the authors' knowledge, no research has
147 been conducted using questionnaire surveys. To address this gap in the literature, the authors
148 conducted a questionnaire survey in Palu City and Donggala Regency a month after the event,
149 and gathered basic information about tsunami awareness, preparedness and the evacuation
150 behaviour of coastal residents in each community. The primary aims of the present study are
151 thus to characterise the tsunami awareness and evacuation behaviour of individuals during the
152 *2018 Sulawesi Tsunami*, to examine the relationships between these variables and basic
153 demographic information (such as age or gender) , and to derive lessons to improve the
154 resilience of coastal communities that could suffer from submarine landslide tsunamis in the
155 future.

156

157 **2. Methodology**

158 A field survey was conducted approximately one month after the tsunami, between the 27th and
159 31st of October 2018, concentrating on the coastline of Palu City and Donggala Regency. A
160 questionnaire survey was administered by four native Indonesian speakers to individuals living
161 in the residential areas of Palu and Donggala. More specifically, during the field survey, the
162 authors drove along a road that runs parallel to the coastline of the bay, stopping whenever they
163 saw a group of local residents, moment at which the enumerators got off the vehicle and
164 administered the questionnaire survey. A total of 200 questionnaire sheets were used, as this
165 number would give a confidence interval of 10%¹. The original questionnaire survey was

¹ Given the population of the area, and the expectation that there was the possibility that some respondents might choose not to complete the questionnaire survey, the authors printed 200 questionnaires (though only n=166 would be needed to ensure a confidence interval of 10%). It should be noted that this assumes that there was a

166 drafted in English, following the same basic format as the questionnaire surveys distributed in
 167 Chile and Indonesia in earlier research (see Esteban et al. 2013) and translated into Bahasa
 168 Indonesia.

169 It took approximately 5 to 10 minutes to complete the questionnaire survey, which consisted of
 170 24 questions that were divided into 9 sections: demographics, awareness of tsunamis before the
 171 disaster, information about the tsunami, behaviour during the earthquake, whether the
 172 respondent evacuated or not, behaviour of those who evacuated, behaviour of those who did not
 173 evacuate, and awareness after the disaster (see Table 1). Some of the questions allowed only one
 174 response, though others allowed multiple responses. In the present study, if more than 20% of
 175 the questions were not properly answered (i.e., a questionnaire sheet had more than 5
 176 incomplete responses), the sheet was assumed to be incomplete. It should be noted that this
 177 threshold of 20% is determined based on the authors own judgement and could be considered
 178 too strict. As a result, 197 questionnaires were considered valid out of 200 (valid rate: 98.5%).

179 In addition to summarising the results using descriptive statistics, a chi-squared test was used to
 180 analyse the significance of the relationship between tsunami awareness and evacuation
 181 behaviour and the demographic characteristics of respondents, including gender, age and
 182 location. To make comparisons easier, when investigating age differences the authors grouped
 183 the ages of 10–29 and termed them as the “young population”, 30–49 as the “middle-aged
 184 population” and 50–79 as the “old population”, and then analysed the differences between these
 185 groups. It should be noted that the authors indeed asked questions to those that were younger
 186 than 18 years, which were included in the 10-29 age group. The chi-squared tests were
 187 conducted using SPSS® software, version 25.

188

189 **Table 1** List of questions asked to local residents in the affected area.

Category	Question
Demographics	Gender
	Age
	Occupation
	Location
Tsunami awareness before the disaster	Q.1 Did you think that a tsunami was a real danger for you?
	Q.2 Did you receive enough information about tsunami hazards by the authorities?

normal population and that the sampling was random, though given the opportunistic nature of the survey these are not perfect assumptions.

	Q.3 Did you think that you could evacuate in the event of a tsunami?
	Q.4 Have you joined evacuation drills for tsunamis in the last 5 years?
	Q.5 From where did you get information about the tsunami?
Information about the tsunami	Q.6 Was the information useful?
	Q.7 Did you get an evacuation order?
Earthquake event & Awareness of cascading hazards	Q.8 Did you experience the earthquake on 28 September 2018?
	Q.9 What types of phenomena were you afraid of during the earthquake?
Evacuation	Q.10 What did you do when you knew about the tsunami attack?
	Q.11 Did you evacuate?
	Q.12 What made you decide to evacuate?
	Q.13 How did you evacuate?
For those who did evacuate	Q.14 How many minutes did it take for you to reach the evacuation area?
	Q.15 Where did you evacuate to?
	Q.16 Was there any difficulty in evacuating?
For those who did not evacuate	Q.17 Why didn't you evacuate?
	Q.18 Did you feel imminent fear about another tsunami after the attack?
Post Disaster	Q.19 When did you feel it was safe to go back to your house?
	Q.20 If face a similar situation once again, would you evacuate?

190

191 **3. Results**192 **3.1 Demographics**

193 A summary of the respondents' demographics characteristics is presented in **Table 2**, showing
 194 that the proportion of males and females was similar. The most common age groups were 30–39
 195 (27%), 40–49 (22%) and 20–29 (22%). As the damage to the coastal area was more severe in
 196 Palu City (compared with Donggala) and this was the bigger population centre, the authors
 197 spent more time there resulting in a higher percentage of respondents from this location. The
 198 two main occupations of respondents included being a housewife (35%) or working in the
 199 fishery sector (25%), which is not surprising as Palu City and Donggala Regency are coastal
 200 cities and fishing activities are common.

201

202 **Table 2** Summary of demographics. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Category	Percentage (N)
----------	----------------

Gender	Male	49% (97)
	Female	50% (98)
	No response	1% (2)
Age Group	10-19	8% (16)
	20-29	22% (43)
	30-39	27% (53)
	40-49	22% (44)
	50-59	12% (24)
	60-69	6% (12)
	70-79	2% (4)
	No response	1% (1)
Place of residence	Palu	64% (125)
	Donggala	36% (71)
	No response	1% (1)
Occupation	Fisheries	25% (50)
	Office	5% (10)
	Transportation	2% (4)
	Agriculture or livestock	4% (7)
	Retired	2% (4)
	Unemployed	5% (9)
	Housewife	35% (69)
	Student	8% (15)
	Others	13% (25)
	No response	2% (4)

203

204 *3.2 Tsunami awareness before the disaster*


205 At the start of the questionnaire respondents were asked whether they thought that a tsunami
 206 posed a danger to them, with 100% of the responses being affirmative, which would indicate a
 207 high level of tsunami awareness in the area. However, **Fig. 2** reveals that more than 50% of the
 208 respondents indicated that not enough information about tsunami hazards had been provided by
 209 authorities before the event. In fact, to the authors knowledge (one of the authors of the present
 210 study is a resident in Palu and actually experienced this disaster), there was no education at
 211 schools about tsunamis in the study area. A significant correlation exists between the evaluation
 212 of the tsunami information and the demographic profile of the respondents. For instance,
 213 whereas more than 50% of the male respondents did not have any opinions regarding the
 214 adequacy of the information about a tsunami, a higher percentage of female respondents (71%)

215 had opinions (as either sufficient or insufficient, with the majority feeling the latter). Moreover,
 216 none of the respondents in the old population group responded that the information provided by
 217 the authorities had been satisfactory. Interestingly, a clear difference in the percentage of people
 218 who did not know whether the information had been satisfactory exists between the two
 219 locations, with 18% of the respondents in Palu City and 87% in Donggala Regency feeling this
 220 way.

221 A significant correlation was also found between the confidence in being able to evacuate and
 222 the demographic profile of the respondent. Male respondents and those in Donggala Regency
 223 reported being more confident in being able to evacuate from a tsunami (see **Fig. 3**). The reason
 224 why respondents in Donggala Regency were more confident could be explained by its relatively
 225 hilly terrain, which would allow people to easily evacuate (Mikami et al., 2019). Regarding age,
 226 while one could expect younger respondents to be more confident to be able to evacuate, the
 227 opposite was true, with older respondents appearing more secure in this respect. This could be
 228 related to their experiences and knowledge about tsunamis, though more detailed research
 229 would be needed to prove whether this is true.

230 **Figure 4** indicates how over 95% of the respondents had never participated in tsunami
 231 evacuation drills or had access to any drill. Those who had participated were mostly below 50
 232 years of age, though in this case none of the answers were statistically significant. To the
 233 authors' knowledge, as no tsunami evacuation drills were ever conducted in the study area (at
 234 elementary schools the government only conducts earthquake evacuation drills), those who had
 235 participated might have done so at other locations in Indonesia.

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


237

238 **Fig. 2** Distribution of responses regarding whether respondents thought that they had been
 239 sufficiently informed about tsunami hazards by authorities. Percentages may not add up to 100%
 240 because of rounding. ** $p < 0.01$. * $p < 0.05$.

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


243

244 **Fig. 3** Distribution of responses regarding whether respondents thought that they could evacuate in
 245 the event of a tsunami. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. ** $p < 0.01$. * $p <$
 246 0.05 .

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249

250 **Fig. 4** Distribution of responses regarding whether respondents had joined tsunami evacuation drills
 251 in the past 5 years. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

252

253 **3.2 Information about the tsunami**

254 A summary of the sources of information on the tsunami is presented in **Table 3**. Contrary to
 255 the observations in other coastal disasters (e.g. the *2013 Typhoon Haiyan* in the Philippines
 256 (Esteban et al., 2016), the *2018 Typhoon Jebi* in Japan (Takabatake et al., 2018a) and the *2009*
 257 *Samoa Tsunami in Samoa* (Lindell et al., 2015)), fewer people received information from the
 258 media (e.g. TV, radio or Internet) during the event. The results also indicate that few
 259 respondents obtained information from public speakers, confirming that tsunami sirens indeed
 260 failed to provide any warning (an electricity blackout happened to the whole Palu and
 261 Donggala, as some towers of electricity transmission were broken). Instead, most respondents
 262 received information through face-to-face communication with neighbours (46%) and family
 263 members (22%), or by making their own deductions (after feeling the earthquake: 42%; after
 264 seeing or hearing the state of the sea: 19%). Male, older, and Donggala Regency respondents
 265 mostly received information from others, whereas many female, younger and Palu City
 266 respondents relied on their own deductions. In fact, significant statistical relationships exist
 267 between the likelihood of citing ‘neighbour’ and ‘own assumptions after feeling an earthquake’
 268 as information sources and two of the demographics (gender and location).

269 More than 90% of the respondents indicated that the information obtained was useful or
 270 extremely useful (**Fig. 5**). Significant relationships were obtained between the age and location
 271 demographic variable, with younger and Donggala Regency respondents giving a lower
 272 evaluation to the quality of the information obtained.

273 **Figure 6** indicates that a high percentage of respondents received an evacuation order.
 274 However, as explained previously, although an evacuation order was issued by authorities
 275 immediately after the earthquake (BMKG, 2018), the information was not widely disseminated
 276 (due to the malfunction of the tsunami sirens). Thus, the evacuation order that they received
 277 would likely have been the one given to them by others (e.g. neighbours, or family members).
 278 Significant relationships were not found between this question and any of the demographic
 279 variables.

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
281 **Table 3** Sources of information about the tsunami (multiple-choice allowed). ** $p < 0.01$. * $p < 0.05$.

Answer options	All	Gender (N=195)	Age (N=196)	Location (N=196)
----------------	-----	----------------	-------------	------------------

	(N=197)	Male	Female	10-29	30-49	50-79	Palu	Donggala
TV, Radio	10%	12%	6%	7%	10%	13%	6%	17%
Loudspeaker car	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Area loudspeaker	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Internet	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Family, relatives	22%	26%	17%	15%	21%	33%	19%	27%
Neighbors	46%	62%**	30%**	48%	46%	40%	34%**	68%**
Police and/or firefighter	1%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Deduced by themselves (after feeling earthquake)	42%	30%**	54%**	42%	42%	40%	53%**	23%**
Deduced by themselves (after seeing or hearing the sea)	19%	12%*	27%*	22%	20%	15%	22%	13%

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
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Fig. 5 Distribution of responses regarding whether the information respondents obtained about the tsunami was useful. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05.

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Fig. 6 Distribution of responses regarding whether respondents had received an evacuation order. It should be noted that the evacuation order in this case would not be an official one, but rather an unofficial one from neighbors or family members. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

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295 3.3 Awareness of cascading hazards

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All respondents confirmed that they felt the earthquake on 28 September 2018. Respondents were asked what phenomena they thought would take place after the ground shaking, in order to clarify their overall disaster awareness and what the percentage of people who had anticipated a tsunami. Generally, people who anticipated a tsunami attack after the ground shaking should start evacuation earlier than others. However, there are many cascading hazards that can occur after an earthquake, and in the present study the authors focused on five of these. Indeed, it appears that the intense shaking caused fear of potential types of associated disasters, with respondents indicating that these included a tsunami (83%), house/building collapse (53%), landslides (12%), liquefaction (9%) and fire (1%) (see **Table 4**). It should be noted that multiple choice was allowed in this question. The difference between the most cited response for Palu City (tsunami, 97%) and Donggala Regency respondents (house or building collapse, 65%) may indicate a significant disparity in tsunami-likelihood awareness between the two locations.

308

309

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Table 4 Phenomena that respondents were afraid of during the event (multiple-choice allowed). ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05.

Answer options	All (N=197)	Gender (N=195)			Age (N=196)			Location (N=196)	
		Male	Female	10-29	30-49	50-79	Palu	Donggala	

House / building collapse	53%	64%**	42%**	46%	57%	55%	46%*	65%*
Tsunami	83%	80%	86%	64%**	93%**	85%**	97%**	59%**
Liquefaction	9%	9%	8%	7%	12%	5%	9%	10%
Fire	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Landslides	12%	13%	11%	15%	11%	10%	10%	16%

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312

313 **3.4 Evacuation**

314 **Table 5** shows the actions taken by respondents when they became aware about the tsunami
 315 attack. Most respondents (95%) indicated that they prepared to evacuate, 16% contacted
 316 families or neighbours, 6% collected further information and 2% just waited. No respondent
 317 mentioned going to the sea after knowing about the tsunami attack.

318

319 **Table 5** Actions taken by the respondents when they knew about the tsunami attack (multiple-choice
 320 allowed). ** $p < 0.01$. * $p < 0.05$.

Answer options	All (N=197)	Gender (N=195)		Age (N=196)			Location (N=196)	
		Male	Female	10-29	30-49	50-79	Palu	Donggala
Just waited	2%	2%	2%	3%	1%	3%	1%	4%
Prepared to evacuate	95%	92%	98%	93%	97%	93%	98%*	90%*
Collected further information	6%	7%	5%	14%**	4%**	0%**	2%**	14%**
Contacted family or neighbors	16%	25%**	8%**	22%	12%	15%	14%	21%
Went to the sea	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

321

322 Almost all of the respondents answered that they evacuated (only one respondent did not
 323 evacuate, as he was out of the risk area). The respondents' reasons for evacuation (evacuation
 324 trigger) are presented in **Table 6**, with nearly 50% indicating feeling the ground shaking, around
 325 10% mentioning one or more environmental signals of a tsunami (e.g., 12% noticing an unusual
 326 behaviour of the sea surface, 7% hearing loud sounds from the sea, 6% directly observing the
 327 seawater approaching land and 7% being caught by the tsunami waves). However, the most
 328 frequently cited reason for evacuation is that they saw someone else evacuating (83%),
 329 demonstrating that this social trigger worked well, and decreased the number of residents caught
 330 by the flooding. No respondent cited the evacuation warning from local authorities as the reason
 331 for starting to evacuate, further confirming the poor dissemination of the official evacuation

332 warning in the study area before the tsunami arrived.

333 The “feeling the ground motion” trigger correlated significantly with age and location. Older
 334 people and Palu City residents started evacuating after feeling the ground shaking, whereas
 335 younger people and Donggala Regency residents did so after seeing someone else evacuating.
 336 The rapid evacuation of Palu City residents after feeling the earthquake could be explained by
 337 their high level of awareness of tsunami as a cascading effect of an earthquake (see **Table 4**).

338 **Figure 7** shows different modes of evacuation. It is possible to observe that only 1% of the
 339 respondents evacuated by car, which is clearly different from the evacuation behaviour observed
 340 during the *2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami* (in which around 50% of the evacuees used
 341 their car for evacuation). In the present event, the vast majority of people evacuated by foot,
 342 regardless of their demographic background. While part of this could be explained by the
 343 relative low car ownership in the area, the use of motorbikes is more widespread, though few
 344 reported to use this mode of transportation. The reason for this appears to be that immediately
 345 after the earthquake there were many people running and walking on the road, and thus due to
 346 this congestion evacuees could not use cars/motorcycles (one of the authors of the present study
 347 is a survivor from the tsunami, and actually witnessed severe congestion on the road leading to
 348 higher ground soon after the earthquake). There is also the possibility that many of the
 349 residents knew where to evacuate to in the event of a tsunami, and the distance from their
 350 position to this safe location was short, which meant they did not need to use a vehicle.


351

352 **Table 6** Reasons why respondents decided to evacuate (multiple-choice allowed). ** $p < 0.01$. * $p <$
 353 0.05 .

Answer options	All (N=194)	Gender (N=192)		Age (N=193)			Location (N=193)	
		Male	Female	10-29	30-49	50-79	Palu	Donggala
Feeling the ground motion	50%	51%	48%	31%**	60%**	55%**	59%**	33%**
Seeing unusual behavior of the sea surface	12%	10%	14%	5%	13%	18%	15%*	6%*
Hearing a loud sound from the sea	7%	5%	8%	3%	10%	5%	11%**	0%**
Being caught by sea water	7%	9%	5%	0%**	13%**	5%**	8%	6%
Seeing someone evacuating	83%	91%**	74%**	86%*	86%*	68%*	74%**	97%**
Hearing someone calling for evacuation	4%	3%	5%	0%*	6%*	5%*	6%	1%
Receiving a message from the authorities through TV, radio, sirens, etc.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

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Fig. 7 Distribution of responses regarding how respondents evacuated. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. ** $p < 0.01$. * $p < 0.05$.

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The time taken by respondents to reach the evacuation area (see **Fig. 8**) varied from 0–5 min (24%), 5–10 min (36%), 15–30 min (20%) and more than 30 min (21%). As expected, respondents in good physical shape (i.e., male, younger) took less time to reach a safe place. For instance, over 40% of the respondents aged 10–29 reached the evacuation area within 5 min, whereas only 10% of those aged 50–79 was able to do the same. A higher percentage of people in Donggala Regency finished evacuation within 5 min, and this is explained by its relatively hilly terrain, allowing people to easily reach a safe place (Mikami et al., 2019). This hypothesis is supported by data in **Fig. 9**, which shows the evacuation destination of the respondents. A higher percentage of those in Donggala Regency (68%) indicated that they evacuated to nearby high ground.

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
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Regarding the difficulties encountered during the evacuation (**Table 7**), 63% of the respondents indicated congestion in the roads leading to a safe place (corroborating earlier explanations about the mode of evacuation). Although there was not a clear influence of gender in this reporting, other demographic characteristics showed strong correlations. Particularly, a significantly higher percentage of people in Palu City (75%) experienced congestion on the roads while evacuating, compared with those in Donggala Regency (39%), which can be easily explained by the higher population density in the area. Many respondents in Donggala Regency also indicated that they faced difficulty with deciding what to take with them, particularly amongst the younger respondents.

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


381

382 **Fig. 8** Distribution of responses regarding how many minutes respondents took to reach a safe place.
 383 Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05.

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387 **Fig. 9** Distribution of responses regarding where respondents evacuated to. Percentages may not add
 388 up to 100% due to rounding. ** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05.

389

390 **Table 7** Difficulties that the respondents faced while evacuating (multiple-choice allowed). ** p <
 391 0.01. * p < 0.05.

Answer options	All (N=186)	Gender (N=184)		Age (N=185)			Location (N=185)	
		Male	Female	10-29	30-49	50-79	Palu	Donggala
I didn't know what to bring	20%	24%	15%	35%**	16%**	8%**	5%**	48%**
I had to look for relatives	22%	28%	17%	15%	25%	27%	26%	14%
There were too many people on the way to safety	62%	56%	70%	44%**	70%**	68%**	75%**	39%**
I didn't know where to go	7%	9%	4%	0%**	11%**	5%**	9%*	2%*


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393 3.5 Post disaster

394 Almost all respondents (99%) indicated that they remained frightened after the event. **Figure 10**
 395 displays the time when residents felt it was safe to return home, with more than 50% only doing
 396 so after a week or more. A news article (Shelley et al. 2018) reported that for the case of this
 397 disaster it was difficult to quickly deliver aid, due to the difficulty in accessing the affected
 398 areas. That delay and the challenge to obtain fresh water and food could have influenced the
 399 mental state of respondents, and help to explain why it took so long for them to return.
 400 Statistically significant correlations were found for all three demographic variables, with male,
 401 younger and Donggala Regency respondents likely needing less time to feel safe to return home.
 402 Finally, all (100%) of the respondents confirmed they would evacuate if a similar situation
 403 occurred in the future, which was not surprising.

404

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407 **Fig. 10** Distribution of respondents regarding the time when they felt safe to go back to house. ** p
 408 < 0.01. * p < 0.05.

409

410 4. Discussion

411 The tsunami that affected Palu City and Donggala Regency originated from, and was amplified
 412 by, multiple submarine landslides. Takagi et al. (2019) and Mikami et al. (2019) interviewed
 413 several survivors who witnessed tsunami waves and reported that at least three waves, with the
 414 third being the largest, arrived at Palu City. Videos taken by survivors also revealed that the
 415 three waves reached Palu City within 10 min of the earthquake (Takagi et al. (2019) also
 416 confirmed the arrival time of the tsunami waves using a numerical simulation). This indicates
 417 that residents had barely a minute to start to evacuate from the coastline after the initial
 418 earthquake (though this first wave was quite limited in height). As previously discussed, official
 419 tsunami warnings failed to reach most residents. Likewise, challenging evacuation requirements
 420 (in terms of the short arrival time of tsunami) were observed during the *1964 Alaska Earthquake*
 421 *Tsunami*, which also resulted from submarine landslides. It is thus worthwhile to derive some
 422 lessons that could be helpful to decrease the damage and casualties from future submarine
 423 landslide tsunamis, by comparing the tsunami awareness and evacuation behaviour analysed in
 424 the present study with those of other coastal disasters in the past.

425 4.1 Tsunami Awareness

426 A questionnaire survey conducted amongst the people affected by the *2004 Indian Ocean*

427 *Tsunami* revealed that many lacked enough knowledge about tsunamis and were unable to link a
428 severe earthquake with the likelihood of a tsunami. In fact, Kurita et al. (2007) show that more
429 than 70% of the respondents in Indonesia at the time were ignorant about what tsunamis were.
430 Iemura et al. (2006) also indicate that more than 90% of the respondents in Banda Ache,
431 Indonesia, were unaware of the risks associated with a major earthquake. Evidently, the level of
432 tsunami awareness increased significantly after that amongst the population of Indonesia, as all
433 respondents in the present study knew the dangers of tsunami, and 83% anticipated that a
434 tsunami could take place following an earthquake. Such high levels of awareness that a tsunami
435 could follow an earthquake have also been highlighted in the other places at risk (Lindell et al.,
436 2015; Esteban et al., 2015), though the percentage of respondents answering this (83%) exceeds
437 that (55%) reported for the *2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami* (Cabinet Office of Japan,
438 2012). Considering that few respondents in the present study felt that the information provided
439 by the authorities had been enough (and many had not participated in evacuation drills), the
440 high level of awareness could be the result of oral transmission of prior events to new
441 generations, TV footage and associated media coverage (including the extreme devastation
442 caused by events like the *2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami* or the *2011 Tohoku Earthquake and*
443 *Tsunami*) rather than official efforts to disseminate information about tsunami hazards.

444 As explained earlier, evacuating from a submarine landslide tsunami is more difficult than
445 doing so from a co-seismic tsunami, as existing tsunami warning systems are generally
446 unsuitable for submarine or subaerial landslide tsunamis due to their short arrival times (Takagi
447 et al. 2019). Thus, to minimise casualties from a similar event in the future, residents must
448 quickly establish a link between strong ground shaking and the potential for a tsunami to arrive
449 and start evacuation immediately by their own initiative. Although at present people in
450 Indonesia report to have a higher level of tsunami awareness than in the past, knowledge on the
451 risks and characteristics of submarine landslide tsunamis might not be sufficient. It is thus
452 necessary for authorities to focus on disseminating information about submarine landslide
453 tsunamis in potential areas at risk.

454 ***4.2 Information source and evacuation behaviour***

455 Mass media is known to play an important role in the disseminating of disaster information,
456 especially in cases of a slow disaster onset, such as typhoons, storm surges (Esteban et al. 2016;
457 Takabatake et al., 2018a; Senoo et al., 2019) and far-field tsunamis (Perry, 2007). However, as
458 the present tsunami affected coastal areas within a short time after the occurrence of the
459 earthquake and due to the damage to the electricity supply system, only 10% of the respondents
460 obtained information through TV or radio, which is much smaller than the 85% reported for the
461 *2013 Typhoon Haiyan* (see Esteban et al. 2016). Rather, many respondents received information

462 about the tsunami from neighbours or family members (46% and 22%, respectively), which is
463 consistent with the findings from other near-field tsunami disaster studies (e.g., Esteban et al.
464 2013; Wei et al. 2017).

465 *50% of respondents answered that they decided to evacuate due to feeling the*
466 *ground shaking, which is similar to that reported in previous events (around*
467 *60% and 45% did so for the 2010 Chilean (Esteban et al. 2015) and 2011*
468 *Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2012), respectively).*
469 *Given the shorter arrival time of submarine landslide tsunamis, it is necessary*
470 *to increase awareness so that more people evacuate immediately after an*
471 *earthquake, especially in coastal areas that are at risk of being hit by this type*
472 *of tsunami event. Interestingly, although only around 15% cited ‘seeing others*
473 *evacuating’ as the reason for evacuation during the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake*
474 *and Tsunami (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2012), 83% did so for the present event,*
475 *indicating that this social warning significantly helped in decreasing fatalities.*
476 *Prompt evacuation should thus play a crucial role to decrease the number of*
477 *fatalities from future submarine landslide tsunamis, and it is thus important to*
478 *conduct further research to clarify why more people evacuated due to this social*
479 *warning in the study area than in other places. Contrary to the case of the 2011*
480 *Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami (where over 50% evacuated by car), more*
481 *than 80% of respondents in this study walked to safe areas. This difference can*
482 *be explained by the difference in tsunami arrival times, as the first wave arrived*
483 *at Palu City within several minutes of the earthquake, which did not give*
484 *respondents any alternative options (for the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami*
485 *the first wave reached many coastal areas within around 20 min – 60 min). It is*
486 *also important to note that there was severe congestion on roads and many of*
487 *the evacuees could not use cars. In fact, respondents faced a variety of*
488 *difficulties while evacuating by foot, including congestion in roads, which was*
489 *also noted in a study of the 2018 Sunda Strait Tsunami (Takabatake et al.*
490 *2019a). For the case of submarine landslide tsunamis, as residents should start*
491 *evacuation immediately after the ground shaking, roads are more likely to*
492 *suddenly become very crowded. It is thus necessary to consider the capacity of*
493 *each road beforehand, and to develop an effective evacuation plan, including*
494 *constructing, widening and maintaining new and existing evacuation routes,*

495 *and increasing/or optimising the location of tsunami shelters. In this sense,*
496 *agent-based modelling that is capable of simulating evacuation behaviour can*
497 *be helpful to highlight potential problems during disaster events (Takabatake et*
498 *al. 2017, 2018b, 2019b; Mostafizi et al., 2017). In addition, disaster risk*
499 *managers in Palu City and Donggala Regency must seek to reduce the*
500 *evacuation time for vulnerable people, as the results clearly showed that female*
501 *and older people took longer to reach safe places. This can be done through*
502 *multi-layer safety measures, where the locations where vulnerable groups*
503 *undertake most of their daily activities is located away from the most at risk*
504 *areas (such as by placing hospitals and schools on elevated ground, Esteban et*
505 *al., 2015).* **4.3 Difference in tsunami awareness and evacuation behaviour**
506 **among different groups of people**

507 The differences in the awareness and evacuation behaviour across individuals of different
508 gender and age has been actively studied by a number of scholars (Huang et al., 2015; Wei et al.
509 2017; Bateman and Edwards 2005; Yun and Hamada, 2015). For instance, Bateman and
510 Edwards (2005) reported a higher likelihood for females to evacuate during the 1998 Hurricane
511 Bonnie, due to a higher overall risk perception. The present study supports the hypothesis that
512 women anticipate better the risk that a tsunami might take place(see **Table 3**), and that they are
513 less likely to be prompted to evacuate by others (**Table 6**). Despite the lack of significant
514 correlations between information sources and age (**Table 3**), the results suggest a lower level of
515 awareness and preparedness among younger than older people, with fewer anticipating a
516 tsunami (**Table 4**), more attempting to collect information (**Table 5**), fewer starting to evacuate
517 due to ground shaking (**Table 6**) and more being uncertain of what to bring with them (**Table 7**).
518 The survey results also found that people in Donggala Regency were less aware of tsunami risks,
519 with few anticipating a tsunami after the earthquake (**Table 3 and 4**), many trying to collect
520 further information (**Table 5**), a few starting to evacuate due to severe ground shaking (**Table 6**)
521 and many being uncertain of what to bring (**Table 7**). Although the reasons behind this are not
522 entirely clear, Donggala Regency might have been less affected by previous tsunami events in
523 Palu Bay, and prior generations there might have had less experience with such events (a
524 tsunami was reported to have hit Paly Bay in 1927, see Mikami et al. 2019). Their occupations
525 (there are many farmers in Donggala Regency) could also have had an effect on their lower
526 level of tsunami awareness. These findings suggest the need to focus more on raising the
527 tsunami awareness and preparedness of younger people and Donggala Regency residents in the
528 study area.

529

530 5. Conclusions

531 In the present study the authors examined the tsunami awareness and evacuation behaviour of
532 people affected by the *2018 Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami*. A questionnaire survey was
533 conducted 1 month after the event, and 197 valid answers were obtained. In addition to
534 summarising the overall trend of the results using descriptive statistics, a chi-squared test was
535 used to analyse the significance of the relationship between tsunami awareness and evacuation
536 behaviour and the demographic characteristics of respondents (including gender, age and
537 location).

538 The analysis of the results demonstrates a high level of tsunami awareness amongst the
539 residents of the study area, with more than 80% anticipating a tsunami after ground shaking.
540 Undoubtedly, the high level of tsunami awareness saved many lives, especially given the fact
541 that the tsunami reached the study area within several minutes. One of the characteristics of
542 submarine landslide tsunamis is this shorter arrival time, which highlights the importance of
543 residents evacuating at-risk coastlines immediately after ground shaking using their own
544 initiative (instead of expecting an evacuation warning). It is also necessary for local authorities
545 to increase information dissemination activities about this type of tsunami. For the case of the
546 study area, as the survey result indicates that younger people and Donggala Regency residents
547 had a lower overall awareness, efforts should be made to improve their education regarding how
548 to act during a disaster. It was also found that 83% of the population evacuated after witnessing
549 others evacuating. As there was no official warning, this social trigger played a significant role
550 in prompting evacuation and decreasing the number of casualties from the tsunami, indicating
551 the importance of strengthening the relationship among people in local communities. It is also
552 necessary to carry out further research on the influence of social behaviour on human
553 evacuation behaviour.

554 The present study also revealed that many people faced congestion while evacuating (especially
555 in Palu City). Given the shorter arrival time of tsunami, such road congestion issues could
556 appear in other areas at risk of submarine landslide tsunamis. Even if all residents could start
557 evacuation immediately in the future, they would still be caught by a tsunami if they failed to
558 swiftly evacuate due to congestion. This highlights the need to introduce additional tsunami
559 disaster mitigation strategies (formulating an effective evacuation plan, constructing sufficiently
560 wide and paved evacuation routes, and increasing the number of sturdy evacuation buildings) to
561 ensure that all residents can rapidly evacuate during such incidents.

562

563

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Subject: Conflict of Interest

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Sincerely,

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